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Health inequalities in Europe: Does minimum income protection make a difference? 
Regina Jutz   
GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, Germany 
Abstract 
Poverty, a risk factor for ill health, could be alleviated by generous welfare states. However, 
do generous social policies also reduce the health implications of socioeconomic inequalities? 
This study investigates how minimum income protection is associated with socio-economic 
health inequalities. The author hypothesises that higher benefit levels are associated with 
lower health inequalities between income groups. Minimum income benefits support the 
people most in need, and therefore should improve the health of the lowest income groups, 
which in turn would reduce overall health inequalities. This hypothesis is tested with the 
European Social Survey (2002–2012) and the SaMip dataset using three-level multilevel 
models, covering 26 countries. The results show a robust relationship between benefit levels 
and individual self-rated health. However, the hypothesis of reduced health inequalities is not 
completely supported, since the findings for the cross-level interactions between income 
quintiles and benefit levels differ for each quintile. 
Keywords 
Benefit levels, ESS, income-related health inequalities, minimum income protection, social 
assistance 
Introduction 
While population health benefits from increasing national wealth, socio-economic inequalities 
in health still exist in all advanced industrialised countries (Mackenbach, 2012; Wilkinson, 
1996). To date, many studies have described how health inequalities vary in 
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size between Western societies (Dahl et al., 2006; Mackenbach, 2006). Even though the 
relationship between generous welfare regimes and overall population health is well 
established (Brennenstuhl et al., 2012), previous studies have not consistently found a 
relationship between the generosity of a welfare state and the size of its health inequalities. 
An explanation for these inconsistent findings could be that studies usually focus on the 
different types of general welfare regimes instead of specific areas of social policies within 
the welfare state (Lundberg et al., 2015). Both objects of study might differ in the way in 
which they affect health. Previous studies indicated that the focus on specific social policies 
could be the crux of the matter, compared to the study the welfare regimes (Beckfield and 
Bambra, 2016; Burstrom et al., 2010; Lundberg et al., 2015). In their review of 33 studies on 
health, health inequalities and welfare regimes, Brennenstuhl et al. (2012: 399) concluded that 
‘results were more consistent among the studies that examined policy instruments’. Indicators 
of generosity, such as regulation of benefits or size of specific public expenditures, are 
associated with better overall health and lower health inequalities. This approach breaks up 
the ‘black box’ of the welfare state by showing which features of specific policy programmes 
are important when studying health inequalities and drawing policy-relevant conclusions 
(Brennenstuhl et al., 2012; Lundberg, 2008). The present article contributes to this line of 
research by studying minimum income protection and its effect on health inequalities. The 
goal is to assess whether minimum income protection (MIP) accounts for the variations in the 
extent of health inequalities across Europe. To date, research has focused on policies for 
single mothers, family, old-age and unemployment policies (Burstrom et al., 2010; Ferrarini 
and Norström, 2010; Lundberg et al., 2008, 2015; Rodriguez, 2001), while minimum income 
protection has received only minimal attention despite its fundamental relevance to poverty 
and income-related inequalities (Bahle et al., 2011; Nelson, 2012). 
The lack of studies analysing the effects of minimum income benefits on public health is 
even more surprising, since minimum income benefits are the core of the welfare state idea, 
both historically and as a last safety net to provide a bare minimum of social security. Two 
central features define minimum income protection: firstly, the receipt of benefits is linked to 
a means test, and secondly, benefits are granted at a social minimum that allows participation 
in society (Bahle et al., 2010). Minimum income benefits provide a basic living standard for 
people without income or access to benefits based on social insurance contributions (Bahle et 
al., 2011). Especially with respect to the role of minimum income protection schemes as a last 
safety net, it is important to study their effects on health, and even more so in light of the 
welfare state retrenchment during the last decades. 
Welfare states in Europe went through a transformation from a social insurance to a social 
investment state (Garritzmann et al., 2017; Hemerijck, 2012; Morel et al., 2012). Classical 
social insurance programmes are becoming less important. In the course of the reforms of 
social insurance programmes, non-contributory minimum income protection has become 
more significant for poverty alleviation (Bahle et al., 2011; Hemerijck, 2012; Marx and 
Nelson, 2013). Benefit levels or coverage have not changed as the economic situation in the 
countries has changed, so the need for minimum income protection exists and is increasing 
(Van Mechelen and Marchal, 2013). As consequence of the financial crisis in 2008/2009 
many European countries struggled with high youth unemployment (Diamond and Liddle, 
2012), and restrictions on the duration of employment protection 
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during the years preceding this crisis increased the necessity of social assistance for the long-
term unemployed. 
In addition to the positive effects of generous social assistance for the health of vulnerable 
groups, I assume that minimum income protection also influences the link between income 
and health across the entire distribution of income. Earlier research has consistently found that 
generous social policies and benefits are related to good overall population health and that 
these positive effects on health are not restricted to those who (are entitled to) receive benefits 
(Bergqvist et al., 2013). Therefore, the present article examines whether the health of middle 
and higher income groups is affected positively by more generous benefits, even when 
individuals in these groups run close to a zero risk of ever being a recipient of minimum 
income benefits. If minimum income protection affects the income and health of the rich, this 
situation would influence the size of health inequality in society as well. 
Minimum income protection and health inequalities in the framework of institutional 
theory 
Generous welfare states are more likely to prevent life risks from accumulating and 
disadvantages in one area of an individual’s life from affecting other areas at the same time, 
e.g. becoming unemployed while maintaining health insurance coverage. Consequently, the 
degree to which welfare states differ in their generosity, in terms of minimum income 
protection, is a possible explanation for varying health inequalities across countries (Lundberg 
et al., 2008; Saltkjel et al., 2013). The present study seeks to explain why health inequalities 
vary across countries by drawing on the institutional theory of health inequalities (Beckfield 
et al., 2015). Institutions – including welfare institutions in the context of the present study – 
set the ‘rules of the game in a society’ (North, 1990: 3). In their application of the ‘rules’, 
institutions distribute social determinants that enforce or reduce health inequalities. Beckfield 
et al. (2015) have described health inequality as a function of redistribution, compression, 
mediation and imbrication. 
Due to my focus on one particular social policy, minimum income protection, I have 
concentrated on two mechanisms of the institutional framework – redistribution and 
compression. Both mechanisms can be used to explain variations in health inequalities across 
European countries. The first mechanism, rfeistricution, redirects resources among the 
population and shifts social determinants of health, so that the disadvantages of one group and 
advantages of the other group are offset or at least reduced. Redistribution can be applied to 
minimum income protection since it shifts economic resources from tax payers to those who 
are in need. Welfare institutions are instrumental for redistribution of income, since they 
redistribute collective resources to compensate for negative individual life events, e.g. job loss 
(Fritzell and Lundberg, 2006). With regard to the concept of redistribution, I assume that 
higher minimum income protection benefits are accompanied by lower health differences 
between income groups. 
The second mechanism, domprfssion, means a change in the distribution of social 
determinants of health, mainly understood as a compression at the lower or upper end of a 
distribution. Beckfield et al. (2015) have described compression as limiting how low or high 
social determinants can become within society. While redistribution changes the income 
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distribution at both ends because some people benefit from others giving up something, the 
mechanism of compression reflects only impact on one side of the distribution. Beckfield et 
al. (2017) use the following example to illustrate compression: a minimum wage policy only 
affects the lower end of the income distribution, while the fiscal policy design has a 
compressive effect only on the upper end. As a minimum income, similar to the example of 
minimum wage policy, the social assistance benefits (assuming that all persons in need also 
apply for and receive social assistance benefits) represent the lowest possible income of the 
income distribution. Lifting people out of poverty, and thereby improving their health, plays a 
decisive role in how minimum income protection reduces health inequalities. The improved 
material conditions of the lowest income group lead to better health of this group and thus to 
lower overall health inequalities. In their study on minimum income protection and mortality, 
Nelson and Fritzell (2014) found exactly this effect: more financial resources to cover the 
basic needs of the poor lead to increased health. 
I have described how the two mechanisms, redistribution and compression, explain the link 
between income and health among lowfr income groups. Due to means-testing, the number of 
recipients of minimum income protection is low in Europe, around 5% of the working age 
population in the year 2007 (Bahle et al., 2011: 218; for 2009 see Van Mechelen and Marchal, 
2013). Irrespective of the low number of minimum income protection recipients, I expect that 
a larger percentage of society is aware of the last safety net and its characteristics, since in 
times of economic distress, the middle classes become more sensitive to the risk of long-term 
unemployment and social reforms (Lengfeld and Hirschle, 2009). 
Aside from a general awareness of the generosity of minimum income protection, higher 
income groups are unlikely to directly benefit from this protection because these benefits 
come into play after all other social benefits, such as unemployment insurance benefits, have 
lapsed or are not available to individuals. On the contrary, middle and higher income groups 
are burdened by income redistribution, since they pay higher income taxes and social security 
contributions to support the tax-financed MIP schemes. On the one hand, higher income 
groups may feel that although they support a generous last safety net, they are unable to reap 
any direct benefits; on the other hand, higher income groups may perceive generous social 
policies as protecting, even without any monetary benefits. According to Pfeifer (2009), in 
times of austerity and labour markets under pressure, the likely opponents of MIP, such as the 
well-educated and high income groups, tend to criticise minimum income protection policies 
to a lesser extent. Awareness of a last safety net affects stress levels and may have subliminal 
positive effects on health, which has been confirmed for the middle class: Sjöberg (2010) 
found that generous unemployment benefits reduced the psychosocial stress of job insecurity 
even among the employed. However, whereas the availability of collective resources may 
contribute to a middle income group’s feelings of security and predictability, higher income 
groups may perceive redistribution to support ‘overly generous’ minimum income protection 
differently. Dallinger (2013) found that the income of the highest and lowest income groups – 
as givers and receivers, respectively – are affected to a greater extent by welfare state 
interventions than the income of the middle class. 
While we assume that the second mechanism, compression, can explain a reversal of health 
disadvantages at the lower end of income distribution, at the higher end the effects 
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of compression do not exist. Ultimately, the (labour) market decides the size of income and to 
date, limitations do not exist. The lack of compression, of regulation at the high-end incomes, 
is a possible explanation as to why health advantages for higher income groups, and 
ultimately health inequalities, still exist, even though Western European countries have taken 
many initiatives to tackle health inequalities (Mackenbach, 2010). 
The institutional theory of health inequalities not only provides an explanation for why the 
health of MIP recipients would improve through more generous social protection, but also 
expects a positive effect from higher minimum income protection on the health of the 
remaining population. Simply put, the existence of a lbst sbffty nft and the knowledge of its 
benefits also positively affect those people who are not impacted or threatened by economic 
hardship due to unemployment, disability, or old age. The approaches I have examined to this 
point suggest two hypotheses. First, I hypothesise that the more generous the MIP benefits, 
the smaller the health differences are between the income groups. Second, I hypothesise that 
the lower health inequalities of countries with more generous benefits are due to a decline in 
the health disadvantages of the lower and middle income groups, and not by a decline in the 
health advantages of the higher income groups. For higher income groups, social 
contributions do not constitute a relevant part of the tax load that might negatively affect 
health due to a reduced disposable income, but those groups benefit from the positive effects 
of generous social assistance on the cohesion of society. The following analyses test these two 
hypotheses. 
Data and methods 
Dfsdription of ebtb 
The data source used in the present study is the cumulative file of the European Social Survey 
(ESS), which includes the six rounds from 2002 to 2012 (ESS ERIC, 2014).1 Only countries 
with a minimum of two completed surveys during that period are included. Thirteen out of 26 
countries completed every survey between 2002 and 2012. The analysis contains 137,947 
individuals aged 15 to 64 from 26 countries in up to six ESS rounds. Since the macro 
variables minimum indomf cfnffits lfvfls bne gross eomfstid proeudt (GDP) are time variant, 
I nest countries in the years of interviews (2002, 2004, 2006–2013). In a few countries in 
which the fieldwork of one ESS round proceeds over a period of two years, the year of 
interview is more precise than the ESS round (e.g. in Belgium, the fieldwork period for ESS 
round 5 went from October 2010 until May 2011). 
Missing cases are treated according to a listwise deletion that initially deleted 67,247 cases 
from the dataset. The variable with the most missing cases was housfhole indomf, namely a 
26.6% item non-response. To perform a sensitivity analysis on applying list-wise deletion, I 
ran a model that includes a flag variable on missing income, which did not change the 
analysis results of the model based on listwise deletion. 
Vbribclfs 
Dfpfnefnt vbribclf. The dependent variable is sflf-rbtfe hfblth (SRH), which I measured 
using a single item: ‘How is your health in general? Would you say it is _________.’ 
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Response categories were vfry cbe, cbe, fbir, gooe, or vfry gooe. The interpretation of the 
dependent variable is: the higher the values, the better the health. SRH is a strong predictor of 
mortality and morbidity (Idler and Benyamini, 1997; Jylhä, 2009). Furthermore, SRH is an 
appropriate measure for health inequalities. With Swedish data, Burstrom and Fredlund 
(2001) found a similar predictive power of SRH with respect to subsequent mortality across 
all occupational classes, among men and women, and different age groups. 
Explbnbtory vbribclfs 
Indomf in quintilfs. Socio-economic inequalities in health are measured via a household’s 
total net income. From round 3 to 4, the ESS changed its income measure from a survey-wide 
12-point scale of a household’s total net income to national income categories based on the 
deciles of the actual household income range in the respective country. Calculations of the 
deciles are based on external sources, such as national register data or representative country-
wide surveys (e.g. EU-SILC). 
To harmonise the two income measures across the six rounds, I recoded a household’s total 
net income from round 1 to 3 into quintile categories (after conversion to purchasing power 
parity [PPP] and applying the square root scale as an equivalence measure); I also collapsed 
the 10 income deciles from round 4 to 6 into five quintiles (see also Schmidt-Catran, 2014). 
To reduce potential bias due to varying sizes in the income quintiles across countries – some 
income quintiles contained more or less than 20% – I applied a weight at the individual level 
as correction, so each income quintile contained 20% of a country’s sample. In addition, I 
applied ESS post-stratification weights. As a sensitivity analysis, I ran models that included a 
dummy variable for the ESS rounds 1 to 3, which accounts for the possibility that the two 
income approaches from round 1 to 3 and 4 to 6 cannot be combined. This dummy was not 
significant, and the substantive results did not differ. 
Bfnffit lfvfls of minimum indomf protfdtion. The generosity of minimum income protection 
was operationalised by the annual benefit level (in 1000 Euro PPPs). The variable is from the 
Social Assistance and Minimum Income Protection Interim Data Set (SaMip), which is 
designed for cross-national comparisons (Nelson, 2013). It contains data from 1990 to 2013 
on the level of social assistance and minimum income benefits after income taxation. Benefit 
levels are based on the type-case approach – benefit levels are calculated in line with national 
legislation for three standardised types of household: a single person household without 
children; a lone parent family and a two-parent family, each with two children. With respect 
to the variable utilised, I averaged the benefit levels of the three type-cases, which represents 
the yearly minimum income benefit level per country. The original variable from the SaMip 
dataset is MIPbvfy. This variable includes social assistance standard rates, housing 
supplements, and – if applicable – refundable tax credits and family allowances. Table 1 lists 
the 26 social assistance programmes used in SaMip (Nelson, 2013). 
Control vbribclfs. Several demographic and socio-economic variables may influence both 
health and income, and thus, should be controlled for when analysing health inequalities: 
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Table 1. Social assistance programmes included in the minimum income benefits of 26 
countries. 
Country Name of social assistance programme/legislative framework 
Austria Bedarfsorientierte Mindestsicherung 
Belgium Revenu d’intégration 
Bulgaria Mesechna sotsialna pomosht 
Cyprus Dimosio Voithima 
Czech Republic Systém pomoci v hmotné nouzi 
Denmark Kontanthjælp 
Estonia Toimetulekutoetus 
Finland Living Allowance 
France Revenu de Solidarité Active 
Germany Grundsicherung für Arbeitsuchende/Hilfe zum Lebensunterhalt 
Great Britain Income Support 
Hungary Rendszeres Szociális Segely 
Iceland Félagslega aðstoð 
Ireland Supplementary Welfare Allowance 
Italy Minimo Vitale 
Lithuania Piniginė Socialinė Parama 
Luxembourg Revenu Minimum Garanti 
Netherlands Wet Werk en Bijstand, WWB/Algemene Bijstand 
Norway Økonomisk Stønad 
Poland Zasilek Okresowy 
Portugal Rendimento Social de Inserção 
Slovakia Dávka v hmotnej 
Slovenia Denama Socialna Pomoc 
Spain Ingreso Minimo/Renta Mínima de Inserción 
Sweden Ekonomiskt bistånd/Försörjningsstöd 
Switzerland Aide Sociale 
Source: SaMip documentation. 
age, sex, number of household members (linear and squared), education and employment 
status. I restricted the sample to respondents of working age (15 to 64 years according the 
OECD [2018] definition), as in most countries older people in need receive social pensions. In 
addition, most minimum income protection schemes have no or only a very low age limit of 
18 years. As younger people usually have not yet worked for very long, they have often not 
yet contributed enough to the social security system to gain access to unemployment 
insurance. In the case of unemployment, they are dependent on social assistance and 
minimum income protection. Education was classified according to the International Standard 
Classification of Education (ISCED 97) and used in five ordinal categories: Less than lower 
secondary education (ISCED 0-1); Lower secondary education completed (ISCED 2); Upper 
secondary education completed (ISCED 3); Post-secondary non-tertiary education completed 
(ISCED 4); and Tertiary education completed (ISCED 5-6). Employment status includes the 
employed, unemployed, and those not in 
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the labour force, such as people in education, people doing housework, the permanently ill 
and the retired. 
At the macro level, GDP per capita functions as a control variable to adjust for national 
wealth, which affects health, the relationship between individual income and health, and the 
level of minimum income protection benefits.2 GDP data are available from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank data collection. Based on previous 
research (Wilkinson, 1996), I included the log of GDP in 1000 PPP (constant 2011 
international dollars) to acknowledge the curvilinear relationship between GDP and 
population health. 
Due to the small number of observations at the country level, it is crucial to check for 
influential cases. Based on an assessment of DFBETAs and Cook’s D, Luxembourg was 
identified as an influential case. Following Van der Meer et al. (2010), I used a country 
dummy for Luxembourg, which significantly improved the model (likelihood-ratio test: Prob 
> χ2 = 0.000). 
Anblysis mfthoes 
I accounted for the structure of the data – individuals nested in countries and years – by using 
a simultaneous multilevel analysis with three levels (Schmidt-Catran and Fairbrother, 2016). 
In this case, 137,947 individuals (Level 1) were nested in 155 country-years (Level 2) that 
were again nested in 26 countries (Level 3). Models are estimated using the mixed command 
in Stata 15.1. 
The Intraclass Correlation (ICC) provides the proportion of total variance at the higher 
levels. The ICC at the country-year level was calculated according to Hox (2010: 34; eq. 
2.16). It is reported as a percentage of the total variance (100*ICC). The models include 
random intercepts and random slopes, i.e. the relation of household income and health does 
not only vary between years and countries in their intercept, but also in their slopes. In 
random slope models, the regression lines of income and health for all countries and years can 
have different intercepts and different slopes. I developed the models step by step, starting 
with the intercept-only model and ending with the final model, which was specified by 
random slopes and cross-level interactions. The interactions test the impact of minimum 
income benefits on income-related health inequalities. To interpret the cross-level interactions 
in a meaningful way, I centred the variable for minimum income benefits at the grand-mean. 
Results 
Dfsdriptivf bnblysfs 
Minimum income protection varies broadly across Europe. In 2012, monthly minimum 
income benefits were EUR 1800 (PPPs) in Switzerland compared to EUR 155 (PPPs) in 
Bulgaria. The upper half of the benefit levels in Table 2 is dominated by Nordic countries, 
whereas Eastern European countries are at the lower end. A comparison of MIP benefits and 
gross earnings (in Euros for a single person with earnings of an average worker who works 
full-time) emphasises that high benefits signify generosity: countries 
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Table 2. Minimum income benefit levels (EUR PPPs), average self-rated health (age-
standardised) and health inequalities (ratio of very good health of the lowest compared to the 
highest income quintile) across 26 European countries in 2012. 
Benefit levels, 
descending 
Minimum 
income 
benefits 
/month 
Working 
age  
population  
health 
95%  
confidence  
interval 
% with very 
good health, 
for each 
household 
income quintile 
Ratioa 
Q5/Q1 
   Lower Upper Q1 Q5  
Luxembourg 2042 3.91 3.84 3.98 24.1 38.7 1.6 
Switzerland 1842 4.24 4.19 4.29 26.2 52.7 2.0 
Ireland 1782 4.29 4.24 4.33 31.0 70.3 2.3 
Denmark 1729 4.21 4.16 4.26 36.0 46.9 1.3 
Cyprus 1471 4.38 4.32 4.44 49.6 84.2 1.7 
Netherlands 1466 3.98 3.93 4.03 10.9 24.6 2.3 
Norway 1449 4.12 4.07 4.17 30.0 44.8 1.5 
Germany 1433 3.77 3.73 3.81 10.9 23.3 2.1 
Finland 1408 4.01 3.97 4.05 23.1 30.0 1.3 
Iceland 1363 4.19 4.12 4.26 26.5 55.4 2.1 
Sweden 1290 4.17 4.12 4.21 33.3 41.1 1.2 
Great Britain 1135 4.11 4.06 4.16 21.5 44.8 2.1 
Belgium 1117 4.00 3.96 4.05 18.3 30.2 1.7 
Austria 1079 4.15 4.10 4.19 30.9 43.9 1.4 
Slovenia 1042 3.96 3.90 4.02 17.5 38.5 2.2 
Italy 935 3.82 3.77 3.88 11.8 14.3 1.2 
France 830 3.91 3.85 3.97 19.3 33.7 1.7 
Czech Republic 749 4.13 4.09 4.18 12.8 46.7 3.6 
Spain 612 3.83 3.78 3.88 15.5 27.3 1.8 
Lithuania 468 3.78 3.74 3.81 7.0 17.2 2.4 
Portugal 455 3.92 3.85 3.99 9.7 33.9 3.5 
Slovakia 448 3.97 3.91 4.03 9.8 33.4 3.4 
Hungary 430 3.76 3.71 3.81 10.7 27.8 2.6 
Estonia 399 3.68 3.64 3.72 8.9 18.6 2.1 
Poland 389 3.84 3.80 3.88 12.7 23.7 1.9 
Bulgaria 155 3.99 3.93 4.04 14.8 35.5 2.4 
aHealth ratio: ratio of very good health, highest to lowest income quintile. 
Source: SaMip and ESS, round 6 (2012); except for Austria (round 3, 2006) and Italy and 
Luxembourg (round 2, 2004); data weighted; listwise deletion. 
with higher monthly benefits are not simply richer countries, but often have a higher ratio of 
benefits to earnings. 
Table 2 shows further the age-standardised average of self-rated health, the shares and the 
ratio of ‘very good’ self-rated health according to the lowest and highest household income 
quintiles for the ESS round 6, 2012 in 26 European countries. I ranked and grouped these 
countries based on the level of their minimum income benefits packages. Average population 
health was highest in Cyprus with 4.4 (equivalent to good health) on 
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the five-point answering scale compared to the lowest value of 3.7 (equivalent to fair/good 
health) in Estonia. A health gradient across the five income quintiles was visible in all 
countries, which indicates the presence of health inequalities. Table 2 provides the percentage 
of those reporting ‘very good’ health, although health differences can be found for every 
response category (output not shown). The last column presents the ratio of the percentage of 
those with ‘very good’ health in the highest income quintile compared to the lowest quintile, 
which is a first descriptive indicator for health inequalities. The increasing size of the ratio 
indicates higher inequalities. 
The descriptive data give an impression that health and minimum income benefits are 
related. Countries that are grouped in the two highest groups of minimum income benefits 
tend to have better population health. Moving down the table, overall population health 
worsens with lower benefit levels. A similar pattern can be found in the ratio describing 
health inequalities. Moving down the column with decreasing minimum income benefits, 
health inequalities increase as indicated by the steadily higher percentage of people reporting 
‘very good’ health in the highest over the lowest income quintile. However, the exceptions 
that deviate from the general pattern – such as the Czech Republic with very high health 
inequalities (ratio of 3.6) and medium benefit levels – suggest that the relationship might be 
spurious. Another example is Poland, which has rather low benefit levels and, at the same 
time, low health inequalities. 
Thrff-lfvfl bnblysfs 
The intercept-only model (M0) in Table 3 suggests that with 6.1% a considerable cross-
national variation exists with respect to self-rated health at the country level (ICC: 0.061). The 
ICC for the country-year level (ICC-L2) was 0.006. The variance at the country-year level is, 
at 0.6%, extremely small compared to the overall variance. Thus, in our sample, health varies 
to a greater extent across countries than across years. The proportion of explained variance is 
the highest at the individual level with 93.3%.  
In Model M1, the individual-level variables are introduced in a random-intercept model. 
Including the variables in the model reduces the variance components at the country level by 
11% and at the individual level by 15%. For the explanatory variable – income quintiles – I 
found a typically health gradient of income: each step down the socio-economic status ladder 
is significantly negatively associated with individual health. The lowest income quintile has 
the strongest health disadvantage compared to the highest income quintile, followed by the 
second quintile, and so on. Even though people from the fourth income quintile appear to 
have only a small health disadvantage compared to the fifth quintile, this effect is significant. 
All control variables are significant, and coefficients are associated with self-rated health in 
line with earlier research: with increasing age, people tend to have worsening health, and 
women often report less good health than men (Bambra et al., 2009), and an increasing 
number of household members is associated with better health up to a certain number of 
members, after which health is affected in a negative way (illustrated by the negative 
quadratic term). The better educated report better health (Knesebeck et al., 2006). Compared 
to the currently employed, those not in the labour force and the unemployed report worse 
health (Bambra and Eikemo, 2009). 
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Table 3. Multilevel linear regression of self–rated health on minimum income protection 
benefit levels (MIP) in 26 countries. 
 M0 M1 M2 M3 
Constant 3.9397*** 
0.0429 
4.6202*** 
0.0496 
2.8565** 
0.8933 
2.8480** 
0.8924 
Age (15–64)  −0.0186*** 
0.0014 
−0.0186*** 
0.0014 
−0.0186*** 
0.0014 
Female  −0.0262* 
0.0131 
−0.0261* 
0.0130 
−0.0260* 
0.0130 
# of household members  0.0401*** 
0.0080 
0.0344*** 
0.0074 
0.0343*** 
0.0075 
# of HH members, squared  −0.0033** 
0.0011 
−0.0028** 
0.0010 
−0.0028** 
0.0010 
Highest level of education  0.0608*** 
0.0048 
0.0609*** 
0.0047 
0.0609*** 
0.0047 
Employmfnt stbtus 
(ref. employed) 
    
Not in labour force  −0.1973*** 
0.0178 
−0.1971*** 
0.0177 
−0.1971*** 
0.0177 
Unemployed  −0.1213*** 
0.0185 
−0.1196*** 
0.0194 
−0.1199*** 
0.0194 
Indomf quintilfs 
(ref. 5th quintile) 
    
1st quintile  −0.2885*** 
0.0172 
−0.2995*** 
0.0163 
−0.2931*** 
0.0197 
2nd quintile  −0.1759*** 
0.0141 
−0.1821*** 
0.0134 
−0.1782*** 
0.0148 
3rd quintile  −0.1055*** 
0.0118 
−0.1130*** 
0.0102 
−0.1075*** 
0.0111 
4th quintile  −0.0611*** 
0.0121 
−0.0682*** 
0.0110 
−0.0635*** 
0.0119 
Country-lfvfl vbribclfs     
Country Luxembourg   −0.3260*** 
0.0814 
−0.3262*** 
0.0815 
GDP pc 
in PPP USD, log of 
  0.1707* 
0.0860 
0.1712* 
0.0860 
Monthly MIP 
in 100 PPP EUR, centred 
  0.0119* 
0.0052 
0.0169** 
0.0056 
Cross-lfvfl intfrbdtions     
1st quint. × MIP    −0.0078* 
0.0031 
2nd quint. × MIP    −0.0047+ 
0.0028 
3rd quint. × MIP    −0.0067** 
0.0023 
4th quint. × MIP    −0.0058** 
0.0022 
    (Continufe) 
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Table 3. (Continued) 
 M0 M1 M2 M3 
Vbribndf domponfnts     
Level-3 variance 
(countries) 
0.0450*** 
0.0054 
0.0401*** 
0.0047 
0.0214*** 
0.0034 
0.0214*** 
0.0034 
Level-2 variance 
(country-years) 
0.0042*** 
0.0006 
0.0037*** 
0.0005 
0.0026*** 
0.0004 
0.0026*** 
0.0004 
Level-1 variance 
(individuals) 
0.6900*** 
0.0091 
0.5893*** 
0.0076 
0.5851*** 
0.0078 
0.5852*** 
0.0078 
Level-3 var (income)   0.0008*** 
0.0002 
0.0008*** 
0.0002 
Level-2 var (income)   0.0046*** 
0.0006 
0.0044*** 
0.0006 
ICC L-3 0.061 0.063   
ICC L-2 0.006 0.006   
AIC 442198 413974 413345 413343 
BIC 442238 414122 413532 413570 
−2 Log likelihood −221095 −206972 −206654 −206649 
df 0 11 14 18 
Standard errors in second row. 
N of individuals = 137,947; N of country-years = 155; N of countries = 26. 
Self-rated health: 1: very bad, 2: bad, 3: fair, 4: good, 5: very good. 
Sources: ESS (rounds 1–6), data weighted, listwise deletion; SaMip. 
+p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
Before introducing the country-level variables and the cross-level interactions, I tested 
whether the association between household income and self-rated health varied across 
countries by adding random slopes at both the level of country-years and the level of 
countries. At both levels, the random slopes of the effect of income quintiles were significant. 
Since this finding indicates that the effect of income on health indeed varies across countries, 
earlier research on income-related health inequalities in Europe (Eikemo et al., 2008; Jutz, 
2015) is confirmed. A likelihood-ratio test suggested a better model fit when using a model 
with random slopes. 
In Model M2, I examined the effect of minimum income protection and economic 
performance on overall self-rated health. The significantly positive effect of minimum income 
benefits on health confirms earlier research that examined mortality and life expectancy 
(Nelson and Fritzell, 2014). GDP per capita is also associated with health in a positive way, as 
previous studies have shown (e.g. Kangas, 2010). The country dummy of Luxembourg is 
significant which is in line with findings from regression diagnostics tests. Country-level 
variance is further reduced by around 47%. 
In the final model, M3, I tested the hypothesis that minimum income benefits reduce health 
inequalities. This model included cross-level interaction terms for income quintiles and 
minimum income benefits (centred at the grand-mean). The cross-level interaction terms of 
the first, the third and the fourth income quintile differed significantly from the reference of 
the fifth income quintile and MIP, with the interaction terms showing a 
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Figure 1. Margins plots based on model M2 vs M3. 
gradient – except for the second cross-level interaction term (p < 10%). The gradient is like 
the main effects of income quintiles which also show a gradient: in comparison to the 
reference category, i.e. the top 20% of the income distribution, all lower income quintiles are 
disadvantaged in terms of subjective health. The health disadvantage increases with each level 
of income distribution. The lowest 20% have the greatest health disadvantage compared to the 
top 20%. I expected a less pronounced negative or even positive cross-level interaction effect 
of the lowest income quintile, which would have shown that MIP has an impact on the 
relationship of income and health. However, MIP does not reduce the health disadvantages of 
the lower income groups compared to the fifth quintile. 
Measures of fit, such as the Akaike information criterion (AIC), indicates that the final 
model was the model with the best fit, whereas Bayesian information criterion (BIC) supports 
Model M2.3 
Figure 1 (a) shows the margins plots of predicted self-rated health across the five income 
quintiles from the random slopes model (M2) for different levels of MIP. The benefit levels 
(EUR PPPs 500, 1000, 1500 and 2000) are according to the arrangements in Table 2. 
Predicted health increases by higher income and with higher benefits levels. 
To study the possible moderating role of minimum income benefit levels on health 
inequalities, cross-level interactions are applied. Figure 1 (b) shows the cross-level interaction 
effects of the five income quintiles and minimum income benefit levels on self-rated health, 
based on Model M3. We see that more generous MIP seems to increase health differences 
between the lowest and the highest income group. At the low MIP 
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benefit level of 500 Euros which is roughly the same level as in Lithuania or Portugal, the 
health advantage of the higher income groups is less pronounced than in countries with higher 
benefit levels of 1500 or 2000 Euros per month such as in the Netherlands or Luxembourg. 
Moreover, the lowest income quintile does not seem to benefit from generous minimum 
income protection. The predicted health status in the lowest income quintile assumes similar 
values of around 3.8 (on the five-point scale) across the four different benefit levels. 
Discussion 
Researchers have found a positive relationship between welfare state generosity and 
population health, not only regarding egalitarian, more generous welfare states (Muntaner et 
al., 2011) but also with regard to the design of specific programmes and benefit levels 
(Bambra and Eikemo, 2009; Ferrarini and Norström, 2010; Lundberg et al., 2008; Nelson and 
Fritzell, 2014). The present study builds on this research and has taken it one step further by 
looking at one social policy programme in particular – minimum income protection. The 
results of the present study confirm that generosity in benefit levels is related significantly to 
overall population health, as also was found by Nelson and Fritzell (2014) for mortality. Even 
when controlling for a country’s wealth, the significant positive effects of minimum income 
benefits on health remains. In addition, the present study confirms earlier findings that 
income-related health inequalities vary by country. 
However, the main purpose of the present study was to test whether higher minimum 
income benefit levels reduce health inequalities. My first assumption, that more generous 
benefits would reduce differences in health between income groups, is not supported. Cross-
level interaction terms in Table 3 and in Figure 1 (b) show that the health differences between 
the income quintiles are not reduced after introducing the interaction with benefit levels, 
which means that minimum income protection does not lead to a reduction of the income 
gradient in health. All interaction terms are significant. Figure 1 (b) even shows that the 
differences in health between the lowest and the highest income quintile are largest at the 
highest benefit level and not, as expected, at lower benefit levels such as 500 Euros per 
month. 
After rejection of the first hypothesis, the second hypothesis can only be evaluated to a 
limited extent. My analysis shows that the health disadvantage of lower income groups is not 
reduced by generous minimum income protection. A steeper slope between the first and 
second income quintiles with increasing MIP benefits indicates that there are large differences 
in predicted health between these two groups. Higher benefit levels do not reduce the health 
disadvantage of the lowest income quintile. This finding is surprising, since minimum income 
protection is targeted towards those with low or no income at all. The recipients and 
beneficiaries of minimum income protection are in the lowest income group. For this study, it 
was not possible to test this finding further, since the ESS does not collect data on the share of 
minimum income benefits as part of household income but asks for the main source of income 
with one response category called bny othfr sodibl cfnffits or grbnts. Over the six ESS 
rounds, fewer than 4% choose this answer category, and only about 15% of the lowest income 
quintile fall into this category. Possible health-beneficial effects of higher benefit levels for 
recipients of 
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minimum income protection and social assistance do not seem to have led to a visible decline 
in health disadvantages of the lowest income quintile. According to the mechanism of 
compression, the results might be an indication that the numbers of beneficiaries is too small 
to show an effect for health inequalities. My arguments made in the second section of the 
article that a larger share of the population is aware of the beneficial effects of minimum 
income protection are not supported by the findings. The level of MIP has no impact on 
middle income groups, which would have led to a reduction in health inequalities. In addition, 
the number of actual recipients of MIP in the lowest income group may be too small to 
influence health inequalities. The mechanism of compression therefore does not come into 
play for minimum income protection schemes. 
In line with the second hypothesis, I find that the higher income groups are not 
disadvantaged, even if MIP benefits are generous. The steep slope between the second highest 
and the highest income quintile displays the health advantage of the highest income group. 
Interestingly, this is most evident in the slope of the highest benefit level (2000 Euros per 
month), while it is not that obvious at the low level of 500 Euros per month. The health 
advantage of the highest income quintile, which is more pronounced at higher benefit levels, 
might indicate that this particular group is ‘rich enough’, and may not experience any negative 
effects such as higher taxes from welfare generosity. Overall, health inequalities are not 
reduced by generous benefit levels, but rather increased, and this is partly due to a clear health 
advantage of the top income group. If lower income groups do not benefit disproportionately 
from generous minimum income benefits for their health, MIP could reduce the number of 
people in absolute poverty, but the health differences between lower and higher income 
groups can remain unchanged. 
Recognising the robust positive main effect of minimum income benefit levels on individual 
health, it also is important to point out the inconclusive relationship of minimum income 
protection and health inequalities. To better understand the link between minimum income 
protection and health inequalities, further research should study the recipients of minimum 
income protection and how changes in benefit levels or how transitions in and out of social 
assistance affect their individual health. In addition to benefit levels, future research also 
could include other aspects of minimum income protection, such as conditions of reception, 
duration of benefits, or possible sanctions. Overall, the findings of my study tentatively 
suggest that the benefit level does not make a difference in health for the lowest income group 
compared to the highest income group but that higher benefit levels even lead to an increased 
health advantage of the highest income quintile. Minimum income protection, which is 
existential for people who are not covered by any contributory social insurance programmes, 
may not be an appropriate instrument for reducing income-related health inequalities. 
However, the question arises as to why higher income groups experience health advantages in 
countries with generous minimum income protection. As MIP benefits are targeted and 
means-tested, middle and higher income groups are not recipients of MIP benefits. 
Does MIP obscure another variable, which was not controlled for? Based on 13-year data, 
Nelson (2007: 54) notes that ‘the development of general means-tested benefits shows more 
likenesses than differences’ compared to social insurance. The unexpected findings of the 
present study can be interpreted as a strong link between minimum income protection and 
social insurance. As social insurance contributions are linked to income, middle and higher 
income groups benefit more from the contribution-based  
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components of the social security system, are better protected by their acquired social 
insurance entitlements, and may have a health advantage. 
Future research should consider the interdependencies of social insurance and minimum 
income protection with regard to health inequalities and, in particular, the health 
disadvantages of lower income groups. 
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Notes 
1.  Since macro data on minimum income benefit levels were not available beyond 2013, the 
most recent ESS modules were not part of the analysis. 
2.  Another possible control variable is the size of the welfare state, which is usually 
measured with total social expenditures (TSE) in % of GDP (Nelson and Fritzell, 2014), 
e.g. from ESSPROS, Eurostat (2018). The results remained robust, irrespective of whether 
TSE were included in the analysis or not. Since the variable TSE was not significant, it 
was excluded to keep the models concise. 
3. Depending on the data structure, sample sizes of different levels are used. Here, the 
sample size of Level 1 is used (as also provided by Stata) for the Bayesian information 
criterion (BIC), but to avoid confusion, interpretation of AIC is preferred (Hox, 2010). 
That lower values represent better model fit applies to all measures of fit. 
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Résumé 
La pauvreté, qui est un facteur de risque pour la santé, pourrait être réduite par des systèmes 
de protection sociale généreux. Mais une politique sociale généreuse réduit-elle également les 
conséquences des inégalités socioéconomiques sur la santé ? Dans cette étude, j’examine 
comment la protection du revenu minimum est associée aux inégalités socioéconomiques en 
matière de santé. Mon hypothèse est que des niveaux de prestations plus élevés vont de pair 
avec des inégalités de santé moins élevées entre les groupes de revenus. Les prestations de 
revenu minimum aident les personnes qui en ont le plus besoin et devraient donc améliorer 
l’état de santé des groupes les plus démunis, ce qui, à son tour, devrait réduire les inégalités 
de santé globales. Je teste cette hypothèse à partir des données de l’Enquête sociale 
européenne (ESS 2002–2012) et de l’ensemble de données provisoires sur l’aide sociale et la 
protection du revenu minimum (SaMip) en utilisant des modèles multiniveaux à trois niveaux, 
pour 26 pays. Les résultats montrent un rapport fiable entre les niveaux de prestations et l’état 
de santé individuel autoévalué. Toutefois, l’hypothèse d’une réduction des inégalités de santé 
n’est pas entièrement étayée, dans la mesure où les résultats des interactions entre les niveaux, 
entre les quintiles de revenu et les niveaux de prestations, diffèrent pour chaque quintile. 
Mots-clés 
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Resumen 
La pobreza, un factor de riesgo para la salud, podría ser aliviada a través de un estado de 
bienestar generoso. No obstante, ¿reducen también las políticas sociales generosas las 
implicaciones sobre la salud de las desigualdades socioeconómicas? Este estudio investiga 
cómo la protección del ingreso mínimo está asociada con las desigualdades socioeconómicas 
en salud. Mi hipótesis es que los niveles más altos de prestaciones están asociados con 
menores desigualdades de salud entre los grupos de ingresos. Las prestaciones de ingresos 
mínimos apoyan a las personas más necesitadas y, por lo tanto, deberían mejorar la salud de 
los grupos de ingresos más bajos, lo que a su vez reduciría las desigualdades de salud en 
general. Esta hipótesis se testa usando la Encuesta Social Europea (2002–2012) y la base de 
datos SaMip utilizando modelos multinivel de tres niveles, para 26 países. Los resultados 
muestran una relación sólida entre la cuantía de la protección y la salud individual 
autoevaluada. Sin embargo, la hipótesis de la reducción de las desigualdades en salud no se 
confirma totalmente, ya que los resultados de las interacciones entre niveles entre los quintiles 
de ingresos y los niveles de prestaciones difieren para cada quintil. 
Palabras clave 
Asistencia social, cuantía de las prestaciones, ESS, desigualdades de ingresos en salud, 
protección del ingreso mínimo 
